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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SIGN
AMORTIZATION ORDINANCES
In 1971 the City and County of Denver enacted strict regulations
limiting the permissible size and type of on-site electric advertising
signs., A municipal ordinance declared signs not meeting the desig-
nated requirements to be nonconforming - and provided an amorti-
zation schedule for their termination based upon the replacement
cost of individual signs. 3 The maximum period allowed for retaining
nonconforming signs was five years.
In Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver4 plaintiffs, owners and
lessees of on-site signs, attacked the validity of the amortization pro-
visions under the federal constitution, as well as state case and con-
stitutional law. The district court, however, declined to hear the
state claims and dealt solely with the federal question whether the
ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power or an tsnconstitu-
1. DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE § 613 (1971). The ordinance classified
signs according to types that would be allowed in various zoning districts. It
prohibited all electric signs exceeding 32 feet in height or projecting more than
24 feet from a building. All movement was to be eliminated from flashing,
blinking and revolving signs within 30 days after the effective date of the
ordinance. Brief for Appellee at 2, Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver,
488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973).
2. A nonconforming use is one that lawfully existed prior to the enactment
of a zoning ordinance but that is allowed to continue even though it does not
conform to the new use restrictions and even though similar uses could no longer
be initiated. Note, Termination of Nonconforming Uses-Harbison to the Present,
14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 62 (1962); 44 TEXAS L. REV. 368 (1965).
3. Termination dates were assigned on the basis of a sign's replacement cost.
The theory behind an amortization provision is that a zoning regulation may
require discontinuance of a nonconforming use without compensation. This may
be done if the schedule of elimination allows a reasonable period of time in which
the value of the nonconforming use is deemed amortized. In this context the
purpose of amortization is to effect termination at the end of a specified period
during which the owner may write off his losses as an income tax expense. See
AMERICAN Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT
No. 280, THE EFFECT OF NONCONFORMING LAND-UsE AMORTIzATION 3 (May
1972) ; I R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAw OF ZONING § 6.65 (1968) [herein-
after cited as ANDERSON]; Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses,
Buildings and Structures by Amortization- Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE
L. REV. 1 (1963), Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 305, 308 (1955).
4. 357 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973).
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tional taking of private property.5 The district court found that the
ordinance constituted a confiscatory taking of property and that the
amortization period did not adequately compensate the owners for
the value of their signs.6
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the ordinance was a proper
exercise of the police power.7 The court noted that all property rights
5. In refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claims, the court
relied on United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), and Reetz v.
Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970). The following matters were expressly left for
state court determination:
(1) The City says that some of the signs exist under revocable permit to use
city-owned property. We decide nothing having to do with this contention
of the city nor do we decide anything arising under plaintiffs' claim that the
city is estopped to enforce revocability of any permits ...
(3) The right of the city to prohibit the erection of any or all future adver-
tising signs is not before us, and we make no decision as to the validity or
invalidity of any such ordinance which may or may not be enacted in the
future, although we recognize that there is much authority for upholding
such prohibitions.
(4) We decide no questions concerning the reasonableness of the regulations
as they relate to the type of business involved, the zone in which the sign is
located, the comparable heights of signs in various zones, differentiations
between free standing and attached signs and various other types of claimed
inequality between signs.
(5) We make no decision as to the validity of the sign code under state law.
(6) We make no determination as to whether the code draws arbitrary
distinction [sic] between various signs.
357 F. Supp. at 467-68.
The district court found, in effect, that the ordinance was an exercise of
eminent domain, not the police power. It stated that the City was furthering a
proper governmental purpose -the beautification of the City -by requiring the
elimination of certain signs but that under Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954),
the owners must receive just compensation. 357 F. Supp. at 472. If regulative
legislation deprives a person of virtually the complete use and enjoyment of his
property it comes within the purview of the law of eminent domain. Id. at 480;
1 P. NIcHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMmAN § 1.42 (3d rev. ed. P. Rohan
Supp. 1973).
6. The district court held that the sign owners must be compensated for the
value of the signs over their useful life under the Supreme Court decision in
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
The useful life of a sign extends for the entire period that the sign could be
utilized, regardless of the terms of its current lease. Therefore the owners would
have to be compensated for the value of the expected lease renewals, which is the
most profitable period in the leasing of advertising signs. The average useful life
of an advertising sign is approximately 15 years. Brief for Appellee at 2, Art
Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973).
7. Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973).
The district court had placed great reliance on Almota Farmers Elevator & Ware-
house Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973). In Almota the Supreme Court
held that the concept of "market value" in eminent domain proceedings included
the requirement that improvements be valued over their useful life by determining
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are held subject to a valid and reasonable exercise of the police powers
and that no question of taking without just compensation was pre-
sented.' In the court's view, the dispositive question asked whether
the ordinance was reasonable and therefore within the permissible
scope of the police power.'0 The amortization schedule, however,
which differentiated on the basis of a sign's replacement cost, was
invalidated for failing to present an adequate basis for different
treatment of different signs. The court ruled that reasonableness
required a five-year amortization period for all signs.",
In determining the permissible scope of the police power, early
cases held that retroactive application of zoning laws deprived land-
owners of existing property rights.' 2 Although nonconforming uses
were considered inconsistent with the basic purpose of zoning, 3 it
what a willing buyer would have paid for the improvements. This valuation was
to take into account the possibility that the lease would be renewed as well as the
possibility that it would not. While recognizing Almota's significance, the Tenth
Circuit stated that the district court had mistakenly relied on it in that Almota
xsas limited to eminent domain questions and had no application in a police
power context. 488 F.2d at 123. By confining Almota to instances of eminent
domain, the court eliminated the problems that could arise when amortization is
emploed to eliminate a property right that will produce income until an indefinite
future time.
8. See, e.t., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887). The court stressed that the amortization scheme was part
of a city-wide zoning plan. 488 F.2d at 120.
9. 488 F.2d at 123. The constitutional provisions that require just compensation
and thereby limit the power of eminent domain have no application to, and
impose no limitation upon, the proper exercise of the police power. Markham
Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968); 1 P.
NiCHOLS, supra note 5, at § 1.42(3). For a discussion of the demarcation
between compensable controls under eminent domain and non-compensable con-
trols under the police power see D. NIANDELKER, THEm ZONING DILEAD!A (1971);
Mihelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
10. The court rejected contentions that the ordinance had been pre-empted by
the Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1970), or was an unconstitu-
tional impairment of contracts under article 1, section 10, of the federal consti-
tution. 488 F.2d at 123.
11. 488 F.2d at 122.
12. See, e.g., Note, Nonconforming Uses in Iowa: The Amortization Answer,
55 IOwA L. REv. 998 (1970); Comment, Amortization of Nonconforming Uses,
7 WxE FOREST L. REv. 255 (1971); 44 CORNELL L.Q. 450, 451 (1959).
13. Historically, the desire to eliminate nonconforming uses is derived from the
traditional purposes of zoning - to ensure the health, safety and general welfare
of citizens. The goal of such elimination is to further zoning's primary purpose
of confining certain classes of buildings and uses to certain localities. Lathrop v.
1975]
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was generally accepted that their termination required compensation. 14
The use of eminent domain powers to condemn nonconforming uses
was seldom employed because of the large financial burden it placed
upon the municipality.' s Unless the law of nuisance could be in-
voked to require immediate termination,- nonconforming uses were
allowed to continue, subject to limited restrictions. 7 The restrictions
were intended to bring about the eventual demise of nonconforming
uses by natural processes.18 The failure of such processes to achieve
the desired result, however, led to the adoption of amortization as a
means of eliminating nonconforming uses.'
The Supreme Court of Louisiana was the first to give judicial
approval to the amortization principle.20 Relying on the Supreme
Town of Norwich, 111 Conn. 616, 151 A. 183 (1930); Miller v. Cain, 40 Wash.
2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952); see AMERICAN SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS,
supra note 3, at 1; D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAW §§ 82-86 (1971); Note, Amortization: A Means of Eliminating
the Nonconforming Use in Ohio, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1042 (1968).
14. For a discussion of the compensation requirement see Edmonds v. County
of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 642, 255 P.2d 772 (1953); Kenney v. Building
Comm'n, 315 Mass. 291, 52 N.E.2d 683 (1943); People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105,
106 N.E.2d 34 (1952); Molnar v. George B. Henne & Co., 377 Pa. 571, 105
A.2d 325 (1954).
15. Aside from the financial aspect, courts have expressed doubt that such use
of the eminent domain power would constitute a taking for a public purpose.
ANDERSON, supra note 3, at § 6.70; Katarincic, supra note 3, at 4.
16. See City of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968);
Elkins v. State, 21 Tenn. 543 (1841); Wood, Termination of a Nonconforming
Use, in INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 65, 76 (1973);
29 FORDHAm L. REv. 749 (1961).
17. The regulatory methods that have been employed to restrict the continuance
of nonconforming uses include the following: prohibiting the resumption of a
nonconforming use after its abandonment or discontinuance, prohibiting the re-
building or alteration of nonconforming structures or structures occupied for non-
conforming uses, and prohibiting or rigidly restricting a change from one noncon-
forming use to another. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965); D.
HAGMAN, supra note 13, at §§ 82-86; Norton, supra note 3, at 308; O'Reilly,
The Non-Conforming Use and Due Process of Law, 23 GEo. L.J. 218 (1934);
44 CORNELL L.Q. 450, 452 (1959).
18. It was believed that nonconforming uses would eventually disappear through
abandonment, destruction and other changes. See Comment, Amortization of
Non-Conforming Uses, 24 Mn. L. REv. 323, 324 (1964).
19. The restrictions only limited the continuance of nonconforming uses and in
many cases were not enacted or, if enacted, were not enforced. See, e.g., Grant
v. Mayor & City Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957); AMERICAN
SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, supra note 3, at 3.
20. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929);
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert.
denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929).
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Court's validation of prospective zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,2- the court concluded that the power to remove an existing
nonconforming use was implicit in the power to prevent a future use.2 2
In City of Los Angeles v. Gage2 3 a California court extended this
rationale, finding that the distinction between an ordinance that
restricts future uses and one that requires the termination of existing
uses after a reasonable time is a difference in degree, not in kind.2 4
Gage held that an amortization scheme provides an equitable means
of reconciling the conflicting interests of the property owner and the
public, thereby satisfying due process requirements. 25
In recent years the majority of courts, following the Gage rationale,26
have upheld amortization provisions on the ground that, since they
are simply a method of implementing a zoning ordinance, they are
valid if they have a reasonable relationship to the public health,
safety or welfare.27 These courts have generally ignored the question
21. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
22. The court upheld an ordinance with a one year amortization provision as
applied to a retail grocery store. The court stated that since the village had the
authority to maintain a purely residential district, it could remove any business
or trade from such district and limit the time for removal as long as such ordi-
nance was not unreasonable. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168
La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929); see Comment, The
Abatement of Pre-existing Nonconforming Uses Under Zoning Laws: Amortiza-
tion, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 323 (1962).
23. 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954). The court
upheld an ordinance that required the discontinuance of nonconforming com-
mercial and industrial uses of residential buildings located in the "R" zone at
the end of a five year period.
24. The court stated that nonconforming uses were not intended to be perpet-
ual and that therefore it was reasonable to set a time limit on those uses "com-
mensurate with the investment involved, and based on the nature of the use." Id.
at 459, 274 P.2d at 43.
25. Id. at 460, 274 P.2d at 44; accord, Schiffiett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md.
151, 230 A.2d 310 (1967); see ANDERSON, supra note 3, at § 2.22; Olson, The
Role of "Fairness" in Establishing a Constitutional Theory of Taking, 3 URBAN
LAW. 440 (1971).
26. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
27. E.g., Grant v. Mayor & City Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957),
upholding an ordinance requiring the removal of billboards situated in residential
and office districts within five years after the passage of the ordinance. The
court stated that "constitutionality depends on overall reasonableness, on the
importance of the public gain in relation to the private loss." Id. at 315, 129
A.2d at 369. This statement summarizes the view that amortization provisions
are valid if reasonable. See E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970) (billboards adjoining the highway sys-
tem); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 87 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Fla. 1949),
1975] 307
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of whether termination of a nonconforming use by amortization re-
quires just compensation, reasoning that the reduction of private
property values will not prevent operation of the police power when
exercised for proper purposes.28 A minority of courts have disapproved
of the reduction of value theory as a justification for amortization
provisions.29 These courts have held that when a zoning ordinance
attempts to deprive the owner of the reasonable use of his property,
it goes beyond the proper scope of the police power. Under this view,
the fourteenth amendment gives the property owner a vested property
right that cannot be terminated without just compensation, and amor-
tization provisions are inadequate to achieve that end.30
In Art Neon Co. the court adopted the majority view that the
police power may be invoked to eliminate nonconforming uses. The
aff'd, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950) (gasoline
station in residential district); National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey,
1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d 33, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1970) (billboards in residential
districts); Village of Gurnee v. Miller, 69 Ill. App. 2d 248, 215 N.E.2d 829 (1966)
(junk yard in residential district); Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008,
317 P.2d 798 (1957) (auto wrecking yard in residential district); Eutaw Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council, 241 Md. 686, 217 A.2d 348 (1966) (check
cashing operation in residential district); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968) (billboards in
residential districts); Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501
(1964) (dog kennels in residential districts); LaChapelle v. Town of Goffstown,
107 N.H. 485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967) (junk yard in residential district); Swain
v. Board of Adjustment, 433 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (gasoline station
in residential district) ; Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439
P.2d 248 (1968) (billboards adjacent to highway system); City of Seattle V.
Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959) (business in residential district).
28. An exercise of the police power frequently impairs rights in property
because the exercise of those rights is detrimental to the public interest. Cf.
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1927) ; Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
29. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965); Harbison v.
City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958) (Van
Voorhis, J., dissenting): City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116
N.E.2d 697 (1953); Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Clairton, 390
Pa. 1, 133 A.2d 542 (1957) ; James v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d
661 (1955). Other courts have invalidated amortization provisions on the ground
that they are not specifically authorized by state enabling legislation. See, e.g.,
DeMull v. Lowell, 368 Mich. 242, 118 N.W.2d 232 (1962); United Advertising
Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952). See also
Katarincic, supra note 3; Comment, The Abatement of Pre-Existing Noneon-
forming Uses Under Zoning Laws, supra note 22; Comment, Amortization of
Nonconforming Uses, supra note 12; Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d, 1134, 1159 (1968).
30. See cases cited note 29 supra.
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court did not challenge the amortization concept, finding that it "has
been established by the authorities as a proper method to terminate
nonconforming uses."31
Although recognizing that an ordinance requiring the elimination
of nonconforming signs must be reasonably related to a permissible
purpose within the scope of the police power,3 2 the court significantly
limited the scope of judicial inquiry, stating that "the legislative
determination must only meet the test of 'reasonableness,' that is, the
plan for termination must be 'reasonable.' " The court therefore
31. 488 F.2d at 122.
32. Courts generally review the purpose underlying the ordinance to determine
whether it has a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purpose. Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933) ; see, e.g., E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metro-
politan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970) (removal of billboards to
promote aesthetics); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439
P.2d 248 (1968) (removal of billboards to promote traffic safety).
33. 488 F.2d at 121 (emphasis added). The court noted that in applying the
reasonableness test to the legislative determination other courts have used a variety
of factors:
These include the nature of the nonconforming use, the character of the
structure, the location, what part of the individual's total business is con-
cerned, the time periods, salvage, depreciation for income tax purposes, and
depreciation for other purposes, and the monopoly or advantage, if any,
resulting from the fact that similar new structures are prohibited in the same
area. Where signs are concerned, the courts usually mention the fact that the
use is also of public streets since the message is directed to the passerby.
Id. at 122. The court went on to note that when these factors were applied to
the Denver ordinance, it was basically reasonable.
The list of factors cited by the court is largely concerned with the effect on
the owner of eliminating the nonconforming use. The court found that the
ordinance "does not deprive the users of advertising signs, whether they be
lessees or owners, of such use," Id. This conclusion ignores the real effect of
the ordinance, wvhich is to regulate the use of existing signs to the point of
exclusion. The signs could not be displayed in any district in the City, and in
any case, they lost their advertising value when taken from the business site. See
DrNWER, COLO., REV. MJN. CODE § 613 (1971).
This appears to be an extreme use of amortization. Except for situations in
which the nonconforming use amounts to a nuisance, see Green v. Castle Concrete
Co., . Cole ........., 509 P.2d 588 (1973); LaChapelle v. Town of Goffstown,
107 NH. 485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967), amortization is most commonly employed
to remove a nonconforming use from a residential district. Recently it has also
been employed to eliminate billboards from the federal and state highway systems.
See, e.g,, Santa Barbara v. Modern Neon Sign Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d 188, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 57 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961): Board of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358
(Iowa 1969) ; Shifflett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md. 151, 230 A.2d 310 (1967) ;
Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 533, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598
(1958); 2 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at § 11.76; W. EWvALD & D. MANDELKER,
STREET GR.APHICS 127 (1971): text in note 27 supra. In re Appeal of Ammon
R. Smith Auto Co., 423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d 683 (1966), held that an ordinance
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confined its review to the method of elimination provided under the
ordinance rather than undertaking the traditional review as to per-
missible use of the police power.3 4
While purportedly applying a narrower standard, the court in fact
applied the traditional test to the portion of the ordinance requiring
the elimination of flashing signs. It found that a sufficient relationship
existed between such signs, which distracted motorists, and the pro.
motion of traffic safety to warrant their elimination within a 30 day
period.-5 The legislative judgment that the regulation was necessary
was sufficient in itself to uphold the remaining provisions of the
ordinance.3 6
In Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc. 7 the Maryland Court
of Appeals employed a different approach to a similar problem. Con-
fronted with an ordinance designed to regulate signs in Baltimore's
placing a ban on all "off-site" sign advertising was patently unreasonable and
invalid. The court stated that the ordinance attempted to prohibit, not regulate,
without any regard for the districts set up in the zoning ordinance. But see
Kenyon Peck Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969), in which the
court upheld a ban on moving signs (pennants) on the ground of traffic safety.
Cf. Gough v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 21 Md. App. 697, 321 A.2d 315 (1974).
The Gough court upheld an amortization provision that sought to eliminate in a two
year period nonconforming uses that were conducted primarily on open land and
did not utilize any permanent building or structure. Id. at ........ , 321 A.2d at 317.
34. The court seemed to disregard the established rule that a municipality may
bring the nonconforming use to its predestined terminal point, provided the
termination provisions are reasonable as to time and directed toward some reason-
able aspect of land use regulation under properly designated police power. I P.
NICHOLS, supra note 5, at § 1.42(8); 2 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 16-14 (3d ed. 1965); cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1954) ;
St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919);
Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E.2d 309 (1930); 7
URBAN L. ANN. 304 (1974).
35. 488 F.2d at 123. The ordinance did not require elimination of the signs
but only that their apparent movement be stopped. Accord, Franklin Furniture
Co. v. City of Bridgeport, 142 Conn. 510, 115 A.2d 435 (1955); Kenyon Peck,
Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969). But see City of Santa
Barbara v. Modem Neon Sign Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d 188, 11 Cal. Rptr. 57
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
36. 488 F.2d at 121. The court disregarded defendant's attempt to justify the
ordinance on economic grounds. Brief for Appellant at 5, Art Neon Co. v. City
& County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973).
37. 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973).
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central business district,38 the court examined both the face of the
ordinance and the underlying legislative intent.39 It found that the
sole purpose of the ordinance was the achievement of an aesthetically
pleasing result.40 Although the court held that this purpose was not
a permissible use of the police power, it did review the objective of
the ordinance rather than merely upholding it on the basis of the
presumption of constitutionality traditionally afforded zoning ordi-
nances.41 By not inquiring into the purpose of the legislation, the
court in Art Neon Co. in effect permitted a legislative body to expand
the definition of "public welfare" without subjecting the definition
to judicial scrutiny.4- In determining whether a regulation is within
the permissible scope of the police power, regulatory measures based
on aesthetic considerations arguably promote the general welfare and
are therefore valid.4 3 Such a conclusion is one that the judiciary might
38. The ordinance at issue in Mano Swartz did not contain an amortization
provision as such but did provide a five year moratorium before the City could
seek enforcement of the ordinance's proscription of signs projecting more than 12
feet from building or from roof tops. Id. at 83, 299 A.2d at 831.
39. Id. at 86, 299 A.2d at 832.
40. Id.
41. As a general rule, zoning acts and amendments to zoning ordinances are
presumed to be constitutional and valid. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1926);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); 1971 WASH.
U.L.Q. 673. Nonetheless, a zoning ordinance must be reasonably related to an
end that the state has a right to achieve. Id. at 675.
42. The courts will generally uphold a zoning ordinance only after deciding
that the ordinance is within the permissible scope of the municipal zoning power.
City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954).
43. "Historically, the process of extending the application of the police power
can be traced to efforts to complement nuisance law [i.e. tangible harmful effect
of land uses upon surrounding territory]." Netherton, Implementation of Land
Use Policy: Police Power vs. Eminent Domain, 3 LAND & WATER L. REv. 33,
36 (1968). When zoning for aesthetic objectives diminishes the analogy between
zoning and nuisance law, courts tend to justify such zoning by placing greater
emphasis upon the "general welfare" aspect of the police power. See United Ad-
vertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964) ; Save-
land Park Holding Co. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied,
350 U.S. 841 (1955). See generally Note, Nonconforming Uses in Iowa, supra
note 12; Comment, The Abatement of Pre-existing Nonconforming Uses Under
Zoning Laws, supra note 22.
For sources stating that the police power is broad enough to include reasonable
regulation of property use for aesthetic reasons only see Murphy, Inc. v. Town of
Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944) ; Dade County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d
236 (Fla. 1957); State v. Diamond Motor Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825
(1967) (based on constitutional provision); City of Shreveport v. Brock, 230 La.
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reasonably reach.44
Once it is determined that a valid purpose for invoking the police
power exists, it must be determined whether the methods employed
are reasonable. 45 The determination of reasonableness is based on a
two-fold test. First, a court will attempt to balance the burden placed
on the individual against the public good sought to be achieved. 0
Prior decisions examined the particular factual situation to ascertain
whether the ordinance was being applied reasonably.47 The court in
651, 89 So. 2d 156 (1956); Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hempstead, 173
Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1940); 2 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at §
11.76; W. EWALD & D. MANDELKER, supra note 33, at 107, 110; Dukeminier,
Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMtP. PRoB. 218
(1955) ; Comment, Outdoor Advertisements -Aesthetics and the 'Public Right",
33 TU. L. REV. 852 (1959).
44. If the court was hesitant to recognize aesthetic objectives, it could have
based its holding on economic grounds (the elimination of nonconforming signs
to enhance property values) and could have held that aesthetics is a proper
secondary purpose under the police power. See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S.
91 (1909); E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d
1141 (5th Cir. 1970); Desert Outdoor Advertising Inc. v. County of San Berna-
dino, 255 Cal. App. 2d 765, 63 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973); United Ad-
vertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964) ; People
v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed,
375 U.S. 42 (1963); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439
P.2d 248 (1968). See also W. EWALD & D. MANDELKER, supra note 33, at 110;
Comment, The Aesthetic Factor in Zoning, 11 DUQUESNE L. REV. 204 (1972).
45. See note 34 supra.
46. Courts applying the value diminution rule often couple it with an attempt
to weigh the potential social benefit derived from the enforcement of a regulation
against the private loss. The whole basis of police power restrictions upon property
rights has been a weighing of the benefit to the community against the loss suf-
fered by the propqrty owner. The public benefit is indicated by the degree to
which the use is inconsistent with the community as it exists and with the plan
for the development of the community. Thus, a regulation that confers only a
marginal social benefit may be held invalid in a particular application when the
loss to the landowner is great. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1927);
Board of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1969).
47. See, e.g., National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875,
464 P.2d 33, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1970); City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal.
App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Harbison v. City of Buffalo,
4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958); Bernstein v. Board of
Appeals, 60 Misc. 2d 470, 302 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
The Gage court stated that the validity of an amortization ordinance depends
on a balance between the public gain and the private loss. It took into considera-
tion the investment involved and the nature of the use in discussing the reason-
ableness of the amortization provision. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App.
2d 442, 460, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954). In Bernstein the court
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Art Neon Co. did not subject the ordinance to this test. Instead, the
court stated that the balancing of interests is a legislative function.48
Therefore, the court did not inquire into the effect the ordinance
would have on plaintiffs' businesses or on the public but gave blanket
approval to the use of amortization in this situation."9
The second step in the analysis determines whether the amortization
schedule provides a sufficient period before termination.50 Prior de-
cisions are not entirely consistent. Yet, there is general judicial agree-
ment that amortization is a technique that allows for at least partial
recoupment of the owner's investment in an asset.51 Therefore an
amortization period is generally considered reasonable if it is based
upon the remaining useful life of the nonconforming use5 2 or upon
the owner's initial investment.5 3 In contrast, the Art Neon Co. court
required the board to strike a reasonable balance between social harm and private
loss in determining the period for which a nonconforming use might continue.
The case involved an ordinance requiring a nonconforming nursery school to
terminate within two years of the date of the ordinance. The court agreed that
a reasonable amortization would legally eliminate nonconforming uses but that
until the social harm, private investment, and expected annual return was con-
sidered, the court could not conclude that the ordinance was reasonable. Bern-
stein v. Board of Appeals, 60 Misc. 2d 470, 479, 302 N.Y.S.2d 141, 152 (Sup.
Ct. 1969). See also Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363
(1957). The Grant court was convinced that billboards had a detrimental effect
on residential districts and were a serious factor in the creation of blight.
48. 488 F.2d at 121.
49. But see note 46 supra.
50. See, e.g., Schiflett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md. 151, 162, 230 A.2d 310,
315 (1967); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 561, 152 N.E.2d 42, 46,
176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 604 (1958); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Maryville, 279
U.S. 582 (1929).
51. See note 3 supra.
52. See, e.g., Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957);
Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162
N.W.2d 206 (1968); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 533, 152 N.E.2d 42,
176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958); 44 CORNELL L.Q. 450 (1959).
The Grant court stated that the amortization provision should "determine the
normal useful remaining economic life of the structure worked to the use and
prohibit the offending use after the operation of that time." 212 Md. at 308,
129 A.2d at 365. In Naegele the court held that "useful life corresponds roughly
to the amortization period." 281 Minn. at 501, 162 N.W.2d at 213. The Harbison
court noted that a three year amortization period for a junk yard in a residential
district equalled "the useful life" of a junk yard without extensive repairs. 4
N.Y.2d at 561, 152 N.E.2d at 46, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
53. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 364 P.2d
33, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1970) (upholding an ordinance with respect to signs that
had been fully amortized by the removal date according to Internal Revenue
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significantly altered the concept of amortization, stating that in a
zoning context it "is no more than notice to the owner and user of the
sign that they have a period of time to make whatever adjustments or
other arrangements they can. '"54 Although the five year amortization
period approved by the court in Art Neon Co. may allow some owners
to receive a reasonable return on their investment,5 the court's view of
amortization as merely a notice requirement may be used in the future
to justify the elimination of nonconforming uses long before the owner
realizes any return. Such a result would be contrary to the principle
that amortization is an equitable means of reconciling conflicting
interests by reducing the owner's loss to a point at which it is insub-
stantial.-",
Municipalities have a legitimate interest in preventing the perpetu-
ation of nonconforming uses. Constitutional protections, however,
should not be lightly cast aside, nor should the desire for complete
conformity demand unreasonable individual sacrifices by reducing
amortization to a mere concept of notice to the property owner. The
Service requirements); City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274
P.2d 34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (ruling that a time limit placed upon the con-
tinuance of existing nonconforming uses should be commensurate with the invest-
ment involved); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 533, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176
N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958) (holding that an ordinance can provide for termination of
a prior nonconforming use after a period long enough to allow the owner a fair
opportunity to amortize his investments and make future plans); City of University
Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972) (holding that the property
owner must be afforded an opportunity to recover his investment in the struc-
ture); cf. COMM'N ON HIGHWvAY BEAUTIFICATION, STAFF WORXINO PAPER ON
CONTROL oF ON-PREMISE SIGNS (1973).
54. 488 F.2d at 121 (emphasis added). The court also noted that amortization
in the field of zoning contains no connotation of compensation. Id.
55. The court invalidated the amortization schedule contained in the ordinance
on the ground that the termination provision bore no reasonable relationship to
the amount of the property owner's investment. Id. at 122. The court's approval
of a five year amortization period for all nonconforming signs is consistent with a
line of cases upholding one termination date for all nonconforming cases within
a class. See, e.g., E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County,
425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d
405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968). Yet this causes the owners with the largest investment
to sustain the greatest loss, which is contrary to the equitable principles underlying
amortization. One commentator states the basic test employed to determine whether
the amortization period is reasonable: "[Can the owner of the property recoup the
investment that he had in the property at the start of the amortization period?"
Wood, supra note 16, at 81. The provision upheld in Art Neon Co. does not
fulfill this basic test.
56. See, e.g., Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176
N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
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courts should look instead to the particular facts and circumstances
of each case before passing on the validity of a sign amortization
ordinance.57 To do so requires balancing the interests of individuals
and the community, including the amount an owner has invested in
the business, the suitability of relocating the use, the expense of re-
location, the protection afforded the public, the uses of property in
surrounding areas, and the character of the nonconforming use it-
self.58 The Art Neon Co. court's failure to confront the issue of
aesthetic zoning is also unfortunate. In light of the growing public
interest in maintaining pleasant surroundings, the court had ample
authority for finding that aesthetics are a proper ground for invoking
the police power.59 At the same time, a straightforward treatment of
the aesthetics issue would have provided guidelines for future legis-
lative enactments. Reluctance to require justification for legislative
action may lead to unquestioned acceptance of legislation that crosses
the line separating a proper exercise of the police power from a taking
of property.
Ilene Dobrow
57. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
58. 44 TExAs L. Rzv. 368 (1965).
59. While aesthetic legislation has gained substantial support in recent years,
only a minority of courts will uphold legislation on purely aesthetic grounds. See
Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); Sun Oil Co. v. City of
Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 199 N.W.2d 525 (1972); Cromwell v.
Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); Oregon
City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965). Yet the majority of courts
have held, in effect, that aesthetic legislation is valid if it is thinly veiled by some
other legitimate interest. See, e.g., Rotenberg v. City of Port Pierce, 202 So. 2d
782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247
Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956); State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471
S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1971); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42
N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73
N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964) (dictum). See generally Anderson, Regulation
of Land Use for Aesthetic Purposes- An Appraisal of People v. Skuer, 15 SYRA-
cusE L. REv. 33 (1964); Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and
Objectivity, 71 MicH. L. REv. 1438 (1973) ; Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property
Values and the Judicial Decision Process, N.J.L.J., Dec. 17, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
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